Do Corporate Bond Mutual Funds Exhibit Investment Skill? Evidence from Earnings Announcements

Journal of Banking and Finance, 107776

59 Pages Posted: 8 Apr 2022 Last revised: 10 Jul 2026

See all articles by Xiao Li

Xiao Li

University at Albany, SUNY

Ying Wang

SUNY at Albany - School of Business

Jason Wei

University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management

Date Written: March 28, 2022

Abstract

Using monthly holdings data, we examine whether corporate bond mutual funds trade in anticipation of earnings announcements. We find that high-yield (HY) bond funds systematically reduce their exposure to HY bonds ahead of negative earnings surprises. These anticipatory trades predict both subsequent monthly bond returns and short-window announcement returns. At the fund level, HY funds whose trading is more predictive of negative earnings surprises deliver significantly higher after-fee abnormal returns. Further analysis indicates that this behavior is consistent with firm-specific information that accumulates prior to announcements, suggestive of a credit-specific informational advantage rather than information spillovers from affiliated equity funds. Overall, our findings identify a novel micro-level mechanism that helps explain HY funds’ macro-level predictive power and highlight the potential value of active management in bond markets.

Keywords: High-Yield Bonds, Corporate Bond Funds, Earnings Announcements, Anticipatory Trading, Managerial Skill, High-Yield Bond Returns, Informational Advantage, Credit Analysis

JEL Classification: G14

Suggested Citation

Li, Xiao and Wang, Ying and Wei, Jason, Do Corporate Bond Mutual Funds Exhibit Investment Skill? Evidence from Earnings Announcements
(March 28, 2022). Journal of Banking and Finance, 107776, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4067847 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4067847

Xiao Li

University at Albany, SUNY ( email )

5205615081 (Phone)

Ying Wang (Contact Author)

SUNY at Albany - School of Business ( email )

1400 Washington Ave.
Albany, NY 12222
United States

Jason Wei

University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management ( email )

105 St. George Street
Toronto, Ontario M5S 3E6 M5S1S4
Canada
416-978-3698 (Phone)
416-971-3048 (Fax)

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