Selling Violent Extremism

Abstract

Domestic violent extremist organizations have become a significant threat to Western democracies, with some groups attracting tens of thousands of members. Understanding how these groups recruit sheds light on the latent demand for violent extremism. Surprisingly, I find that extremist groups grow their membership by employing tactics that firms might use to increase sales. I study how demand for membership in the Oath Keepers, America’s largest paramilitary organization, is affected when the group’s leadership employs three tactics: publicity generated by armed standoffs with the federal government, membership discounts, and sports sponsorships. Using a variant of the synthetic control method, I find that standoffs increase new memberships by 150\%, discounts increase new memberships by over 60\%, and sports sponsorships decrease new memberships. Demand for membership is less responsive to these tactics in counties with higher income inequality, but more so in very politically conservative counties.

Keywords: Extremism, Applied microeconomics

JEL Classification: A10