Maturity Overhang: Evidence from M&A

74 Pages Posted: 22 Nov 2022 Last revised: 1 Apr 2026

See all articles by Zhiyao Chen

Zhiyao Chen

City University of Hong Kong (CityU) - Department of Economics and Finance

Dirk Hackbarth

Boston University - Questrom School of Business; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Jarrad Harford

University of Washington; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Yuxin Luo

Boston University - Questrom School of Business

Date Written: November 17, 2023

Abstract

Maturity overhang occurs when shorter debt maturities raise rollover risk, reducing investment, which we study with acquisitions. Using bond transaction data, we build a novel market-based rollover-risk measure and exploit the 2011 Maturity Extension Program as an exogenous shock. Rollover risk dampens M\&A at the firm and aggregate levels: a one-standard-deviation increase reduces acquisition size by approximately 20% of its sample mean and lowers all-cash offer propensity by 4.3\%. Equity markets react positively to cash payment only when acquirers have low rollover risk. Finally, a dynamic model reveals precautionary savings and rollover risk as drivers of maturity overhang.

Keywords: Mergers, Rollover risk, Debt maturity, Cash holding, Leverage

JEL Classification: G32, G33, G34

Suggested Citation

Chen, Zhiyao and Hackbarth, Dirk and Harford, Jarrad and Luo, Yuxin, Maturity Overhang: Evidence from M&A (November 17, 2023). Boston University Questrom School of Business Research Paper No. 4280419, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4280419 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4280419

Zhiyao Chen (Contact Author)

City University of Hong Kong (CityU) - Department of Economics and Finance ( email )

83 Tat Chee Avenue
Kowloon
Hong Kong

Dirk Hackbarth

Boston University - Questrom School of Business ( email )

595 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA MA 02215
United States

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Jarrad Harford

University of Washington ( email )

Box 353226
Seattle, WA 98195-3226
United States
206-543-4796 (Phone)
206-543-7472 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://faculty.washington.edu/jarrad/

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Yuxin Luo

Boston University - Questrom School of Business ( email )

595 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA MA 02215
United States

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