Winning Elections with Unpopular Policies: Valence Advantage and Single-Party Dominance in Japan

Quarterly Journal of Political Science, volume 20, issue 4, 2025[10.1561/100.00024134]

86 Pages Posted: 4 Mar 2023 Last revised: 15 Jul 2025

See all articles by Shiro Kuriwaki

Shiro Kuriwaki

Yale University

Yusaku Horiuchi

Florida State University

Daniel M. Smith

University of Pennsylvania

Date Written: May 07, 2025

Abstract

Do voters support dominant parties in democracies because of policy preferences or non-policy (valence) factors? We consider the preeminent case of Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), and investigate whether policy preferences or valence can better explain voting behavior in three recent elections (2017, 2021, 2024). We first introduce a new measurement strategy to infer individuals’ utility for parties’ policy platforms from conjoint experiments. Using this measure, we find that policy preferences positively correlate with vote intentions, but are not sufficient to explain LDP dominance. Many LDP voters in each election actually preferred the opposition’s policies. Moreover, the LDP lost support in 2024 despite proposing a more popular set of policies. To understand what accounts for this disconnect, we experimentally manipulate party label and decompose its effect, revealing that trust appears to be an important non-policy variable behind LDP support. We interpret these findings as evidence that much of the LDP’s support should be attributed to its valence advantage over the opposition, rather than voters’ preferences for its policies. 

Keywords: spatial voting, policy voting, valence, conjoint analysis, dominant parties, Japan

JEL Classification: D72, C91

Suggested Citation

Kuriwaki, Shiro and Horiuchi, Yusaku and Smith, Daniel M., Winning Elections with Unpopular Policies: Valence Advantage and Single-Party Dominance in Japan (May 07, 2025). Quarterly Journal of Political Science, volume 20, issue 4, 2025[10.1561/100.00024134], Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4371978 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/100.00024134

Shiro Kuriwaki

Yale University ( email )

493 College St
New Haven, CT CT 06520
United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.shirokuriwaki.coim

Yusaku Horiuchi

Florida State University ( email )

Department of Political Science
Tallahassee, FL
United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://horiuchi.org/

Daniel M. Smith (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania ( email )

Philiadelphia, PA
United States

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