Towards a Fourth Paradigm in European Competition Policy? A Historical Perspective (1957–2023)

Abstract

Following an historical approach (including the gathering of new archival documents from various European countries), this article revisits the history of European Union’s Competition policy, from its inception in the 1957 Treaty of Rome (whose articles on this field have remained unchanged) to the Digital Markets Act / Digital Services Act (DMA / DSA) adopted in 2022.

It claims that four main paradigms have shaped the history of the European competition policy. The first – the public interest paradigm – was dominant in Western Europe up to the 1980s (section 2: Genesis), but not within the EEC, where a more syncretic approach dominated in the Treaty of Rome (section 3: Syncretism), before the advent of a second paradigm – the ordoliberal paradigm – which prevailed from 1962 to 2002 (section 4: Revelation). Then, it declined against the rise of the third paradigm – consumer welfare (section 5: Reformation). The emergence of a fourth paradigm, ‘the excess of market power’, since 2015, will then be assessed (section 6: Counter-Reformation).

Keywords: European Union, Competition Policy, Ordoliberalism, Chicago School, Antitrust

JEL Classification: N44