Against Kantian Statism

Abstract

Kantian statists believe that the state is a conceptual pre-requisite for the acquisition of property rights, and hence of freedom itself. They argue that under statelessness, property rights are indeterminate, unilateral, and unassured, and therefore remain merely provisional until a state is instituted. We are not morally bound by merely provisional rights and hence there can be no justice (or injustice) without a state. This paper makes two arguments. Firstly, that property rights need not be conceptually indeterminate under statelessness. Social conventions that fall short of a state can determinacy in ways that Kantians have not adequately considered. Secondly, that the problems of unilateralism and non-assurance are parasitical upon the problem of indeterminacy. Therefore, overcoming indeterminacy overcomes the overall thesis. I argue, therefore, that the state is not conceptually necessary to our freedom, and we have no unconditional natural duty to institute and obey a state.

Keywords: Kant, State, Convention, Freedom, Property

JEL Classification: B10, B13, K11, P14, P26