The Possibility of Thick Libertarianism

Abstract

The scope of libertarian law is normally thought to be the application of the non-aggression principle (NAP), nothing more and nothing less. However, judging when the NAP has been violated requires not only a conception of praxeological notions such as aggression, but also interpretive understanding of what synthetic events count as the relevant praxeological types. Interpretive understanding – or verstehen – can be extremely heterogeneous between agents. The particular verständnis that is taken by a judge has considerable moral and political implications. Since selecting a verständnis is pre-requisite to applying the NAP, the NAP itself cannot tell us which one we ought morally to take. Therefore the application of the NAP calls upon moral and political considerations outside of the NAP itself. Since some of these moral and political considerations are going to be more consistent with an endorsement of the NAP than others, libertarianism is not a “thin” commitment to the NAP alone, but a “thick” commitment to the NAP and other supporting moral and political considerations.

Keywords: Libertarianism, Verstehen

JEL Classification: B10, B31, B53