Ambidextrous Lockeanism

Economics and Philosophy, 36 (2020): 193-215

31 Pages Posted: 30 Nov 2023

See all articles by Billy Christmas

Billy Christmas

West Virginia University - College of Business & Economics; New York University, School of Law

Date Written: 2020

Abstract

Lockean approaches to property take it that persons can unilaterally acquire private ownership over hitherto unowned resources. Such natural law accounts of property rights are often thought to be of limited use when dealing with the complexities of natural resource use outside of the paradigm of private ownership of land for agricultural or residential development. The tragedy of the commons has been shown to be anything but an inevitability, and yet Lockeanism seems to demand that even the most robust common property arrangements be converted to privatised units. This often motivates a move away from natural law in the moral analysis of property rights. I argue however that it is not the deontological nature of Lockean principles that are at fault, but rather the manner of their application. Lockean theory often exhibits a bias in favour of private property: assuming that only private property can protect one’s interest in autonomy, and therefore asserting that each individual has a power of private acquisition. Starting with a claim against interference however enables us to mould the appropriate property rights to each individual’s particular interest in autonomy. This sometimes leads to private ownership, but often leads to various forms of commons.

Keywords: Locke, Ostrom, Original Acquisition, Property, Commons, Natural Rights, Natural Law

JEL Classification: K11, K32, D23, D61, F64, P14, P18, P26, P28, Q11, Q21, Q31, Q51, Q57

Suggested Citation

Christmas, Billy, Ambidextrous Lockeanism ( 2020). Economics and Philosophy, 36 (2020): 193-215, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4634902

Billy Christmas (Contact Author)

West Virginia University - College of Business & Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 6025
Morgantown, WV 26506
United States

New York University, School of Law ( email )

Washington Square South
New York City, NY 10012
United States

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