A Tale of Two Pivots: Nixon, Obama and Beijing

Abstract

This note looks at the outcomes of two pivots: Nixon’s pivot to China in the early 1970s and Obama’s pivot to Asia in 2009. The first created the geopolitical setting for America’s rise to its unipolar moment; the second for its collapse. The lessons from this historical comparison for US policy going forward are drawn out. Where Nixon’s pivot formed a tacit alliance with China and maintained a pin on the Soviet Union, Obama’s pivot turned China into a “frenemy” with its economic and military containment strategy (including framing the Trans-Pacific Partnership as a contest with China over writing the rules of commerce and announcing a new Air-Sea Battle doctrine aimed at China) while at the same time removing the pin on a revanchist Russia as it moved its heavy forces out of Europe. Russia plays chess and moved its pieces forward (Crimea and Donbas) as the US pulled out. China plays “Go” and mounted a multi-pronged strategy to breakdown the US containment. The United States is left playing whack-a-mole around the world, its grand strategy in tatters. The West cannot “contain” China, nor can it stop China’s technological advance. But the collective West can balance China as I show in this paper. To do that effectively, it needs to come together in both trade and defence. And as Nixon’s pivot showed, it has to involve reaching out to China with a partnership, not a containership. The label for this policy – just a suggestion – would be a Sino-Pacific Policy.

Keywords: United States, China, Nixon, Obama, pivot, containment, opening up, unipolar moment, realpolitik, knowledge-based economy, globalization

JEL Classification: F5, F51, F52, F53, F55, N4, O3, O53, P16