Recourse, Litigation, and the Rule of Law
Law and Philosophy, Vol. 43, No. 6, pp. 689-713, 2024
Law and Philosophy, 0 [10.1007/s10982-024-09510-7]
25 Pages Posted: 20 Dec 2023 Last revised: 11 Apr 2025
Date Written: June 29, 2024
Abstract
Recent high-profile lawsuits have supported competing narratives that alternately depict civil litigation as an essential instrument of the rule of law and a threat to the ideal. This essay argues that each narrative captures an important element of truth and that Gerald Postema’s account of the rule of law in his book "Law’s Rule" helps us (albeit unwittingly) to see why. While Postema presents recourse for alleged abuses of power as a universal and enduring facet of the rule of law, his conception of recourse turns out to resemble core features of the kind of adversarial litigation process exemplified by the U.S. federal civil justice system. Yet such a system both promises to promote and threatens to undermine each of the three principles that Postema claims are entailed by his understanding of the rule of law—namely, sovereignty, equality, and fidelity. Realizing recourse thus requires confronting difficult tradeoffs within each of those principles, as well as within the overarching rule-of-law ideal. And if the rule of law can’t be instantiated unequivocally in any particular set of institutions, then perhaps we should be more willing to treat the ideal as a subject of politics rather than just a constraint on it.
Keywords: rule of law, civil litigation, recourse, accountability, Postema
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
(June 29, 2024). Law and Philosophy, Vol. 43, No. 6, pp. 689-713, 2024, Law and Philosophy, 0 [10.1007/s10982-024-09510-7], Rutgers Law School Research Paper, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4669796 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10982-024-09510-7
