The Robinson-Patman Act as a Fair Competition Measure

42 Pages Posted: 7 Feb 2024 Last revised: 24 Mar 2025

See all articles by Brian Callaci

Brian Callaci

Open Markets Institute

Daniel Hanley

Open Markets Institute

Sandeep Vaheesan

Open Markets Institute

Date Written: November 28, 2023

Abstract

The Robinson-Patman Act is the single most unpopular antitrust law among practitioners and scholars in the field. It has been the target of withering criticism for many years. In 1966, Robert Bork disparaged it as "the Typhoid Mary of antitrust." Others, such as the bipartisan Antitrust Modernization Commission in 2007, offered criticisms with more tempered rhetoric but agreed with Bork that the law, by restricting price discrimination and the offering of other special concessions by manufacturers and wholesalers, raised consumer prices and had no sensible rationale. A near consensus has developed among antitrust lawyers and economists that Congress should scale back or repeal the Robinson-Patman Act entirely and that the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission should continue their multi-decade, tacit policy of non-enforcement of the law.

Keywords: antitrust, fair competition, Robinson-Patman, price discrimination, buyer power, monopsony power

Suggested Citation

Callaci, Brian and Hanley, Daniel and Vaheesan, Sandeep, The Robinson-Patman Act as a Fair Competition Measure (November 28, 2023). Temple Law Review, Volume 97, No. 2. Pp. 185-226 (2025), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4717433 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4717433

Brian Callaci

Open Markets Institute ( email )

1440 G Street NW
Washington, DC 20005
United States

Daniel Hanley (Contact Author)

Open Markets Institute ( email )

655 15th St. NW
Suite 800
Washington, DC 20005
United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.openmarketsinstitute.org/

Sandeep Vaheesan

Open Markets Institute ( email )

1440 G St NW
Washington, DC 20005
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.openmarketsinstitute.org/

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