Tunneling and Hidden Profits in Health Care

66 Pages Posted: 18 Mar 2024 Last revised: 21 Feb 2026

See all articles by Ashvin Gandhi

Ashvin Gandhi

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Anderson School of Management

Andrew Olenski

Lehigh University

Date Written: March 2024

Abstract

This study examines whether healthcare providers tunnel profits and assets to commonly-owned related parties by making inflated payments for their goods and services. Such practices allow providers to understate their profitability—which may encourage regulators to increase reimbursements and relax quality standards—and shield assets from malpractice liability. Using uniquely detailed nursing home financial data, we find evidence of widespread tunneling to related-party real estate and management companies. Our estimates suggest that 68% of nursing home profits are tunneled to related parties and that accounting for tunneled profits and assets raises the implied typical investment IRR from 4.83% to 13.11%.

Suggested Citation

Gandhi, Ashvin and Olenski, Andrew, Tunneling and Hidden Profits in Health Care (March 2024). NBER Working Paper No. w32258, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4762965

Ashvin Gandhi (Contact Author)

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Anderson School of Management ( email )

110 Westwood Plaza
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1481
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.ashvingandhi.com

Andrew Olenski

Lehigh University

621 Taylor St
Bethlehem, PA 18015
United States

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