Download This PaperOn the Desirability of Fiscal Constraints in a Monetary Union
16 Pages Posted: 27 Jan 2004 Last revised: 18 Dec 2022
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On the Desirability of Fiscal Constraints in a Monetary Union
Date Written: January 2004
Abstract
The desirability of fiscal constraints in monetary unions depends critically on whether the monetary authority can commit to follow its policies. If it can commit, then debt constraints can only impose costs. If it cannot commit, then fiscal policy has a free-rider problem, and debt constraints may be desirable. This type of free-rider problem is new and arises only because of a time inconsistency problem.
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