Why do Governments Overpromise and Underdeliver? Evidence from India's National Clean Air Programme

Abstract

What are the political consequences of setting ambitious policy targets, but then failing to meet them? We study this question in the context of India's National Clean Air Programme (NCAP), a flagship policy designed to cut air pollution by 40% in 131 cities and address a crisis that causes 1.2 million deaths annually. Using multiple difference-in-differences approaches, we demonstrate that the program had no effect on air pollution. In a survey experiment with residents of NCAP cities, we show that informing citizens about NCAP boosted their approval of the government’s air pollution policy. Surprisingly, this effect persisted even when respondents were told the program had no impact—revealing a clear political benefit from the ambitious announcement, and minimal cost for the implementation failure. This incentive structure is consistent with the lack of political commitment to implementing NCAP, which we document, and is a likely explanation for the program's failure.

Keywords: Air Pollution, Government Policy, Political Targets, Policy Formulation, Policy Implementation