The Governance of AI Companies: Reconciling Purpose with Profits

Abstract

Artificial intelligence (‘AI’) is both a critical driver of economic change and a source of potentially extreme negative externalities. For this reason, two leading AI companies, OpenAI and Anthropic, implemented customised governance structures with the double aim of addressing these externalities while remaining financially attractive to their investors. Other AI companies across the world adopted milder governance safeguards for that purpose. This paper studies these innovative governance frameworks by providing what is to the best of our knowledge the most comprehensive review of AI companies’ various governance structures available to date. It then shows that applicable rules are determinant in shaping companies’ ability to tailor their governance structure to their specific needs and examines the limitations of corporate laws in three European jurisdictions—France, Germany, and Italy—and, to a smaller extent, the US—more specifically, Delaware and Nevada—in enabling flexible governance structures that balance profit motives with public benefit objectives. Finally, it proposes recommendations for creating a new corporate form in the European Union to better support the peculiar needs of AI and other innovative companies, in line with the European Commission’s priorities for the next five years.

Keywords: Artificial intelligence, Corporate governance, Organizational law, OpenAI, Anthropic, AI Companies, AI