The Economics of AI Foundation Models: Openness, Competition, and Governance

46 Pages Posted: 4 Nov 2024 Last revised: 16 Oct 2025

See all articles by Fasheng Xu

Fasheng Xu

University of Connecticut - Department of Operations & Information Management

Xiaoyu Wang

Hong Kong Polytechnic University - Department of Logistics and Maritime Studies; Washington University in St. Louis - John M. Olin Business School

Wei Chen

University of Connecticut - Department of Operations & Information Management

Karen Xie

University of Connecticut - Department of Operations & Information Management

Date Written: August 11, 2024

Abstract

The strategic choice of model “openness” has become a defining issue for the foundation model (FM) ecosystem. While this choice is intensely debated, its underlying economic drivers remain underexplored. We construct a two-period game-theoretic model to analyze how openness shapes competition in an AI value chain, featuring an incumbent developer, a downstream deployer, and an entrant developer. Openness exerts a dual effect: it amplifies knowledge spillovers to the entrant, but it also enhances the incumbent’s advantage through a "data flywheel effect," whereby greater user engagement today further lowers the deployer’s future fine-tuning cost. Our analysis reveals that the incumbent’s optimal first-period openness is surprisingly non-monotonic in the strength of the data flywheel effect. When the data flywheel effect is either weak or very strong, the incumbent prefers a higher level of openness; however, for an intermediate range, it strategically restricts openness to impair the entrant’s learning. This dynamic gives rise to an "openness trap," a critical policy paradox where transparency mandates can backfire by removing firms’ strategic flexibility, reducing investment, and lowering welfare. We extend the model to show that other common interventions can be similarly ineffective. Vertical integration, for instance, only benefits the ecosystem when the data flywheel effect is strong enough to overcome the loss of a potentially more efficient competitor. Likewise, government subsidies intended to spur adoption can be captured entirely by the incumbent through strategic price and openness adjustments, leaving the rest of the value chain worse off. By modeling the developer’s strategic response to competitive and regulatory pressures, we provide a robust framework for analyzing competition and designing effective policy in the complex and rapidly evolving FM ecosystem.

Keywords: Generative AI, foundation models, AI value chain, model openness, fine-tuning, AI governance, Large Language Models, data flywheel

Suggested Citation

Xu, Fasheng and Wang, Xiaoyu and Chen, Wei and Xie, Karen, The Economics of AI Foundation Models: Openness, Competition, and Governance (August 11, 2024). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4999355 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4999355

Fasheng Xu (Contact Author)

University of Connecticut - Department of Operations & Information Management ( email )

1 University Place
Stamford, CT 06901
United States

Xiaoyu Wang

Hong Kong Polytechnic University - Department of Logistics and Maritime Studies

9/F, Li Ka Shing Tower
The Hong Kong Polytechnic University
Hong Kong, Hung Hom, Kowloon M923
China

Washington University in St. Louis - John M. Olin Business School ( email )

One Brookings Drive
Campus Box 1133
St. Louis, MO 63130-4899
United States

Wei Chen

University of Connecticut - Department of Operations & Information Management ( email )

1 University Pl
Stamford, CT 06902
United States

Karen Xie

University of Connecticut - Department of Operations & Information Management ( email )

1 University Pl
Stamford, CT 06901
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
1,191
Abstract Views
3,428
Rank
46,222
PlumX Metrics