Environmental Litigation as Scrutiny: A Four Decade Analysis of Justice, Firms, and Pollution in India

89 Pages Posted: 14 Nov 2024 Last revised: 14 Nov 2024

See all articles by Sandeep Bhupatiraju

Sandeep Bhupatiraju

World Bank

Daniel Chen

University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Shareen Joshi

Georgetown University

Peter Neis

Université Clermont Auvergne

Shashank Singh

University of California Berkeley, Haas School of Business

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: October 31, 2024

Abstract

This study investigates the impact of judicial enforcement on environmental outcomes in India, using a unique dataset spanning four decades that includes court cases, pollution data, corporate finances, and infant mortality rates. Leveraging the quasi-random assignment of cases to judges and their writing styles, we find evidence consistent with litigation as scrutiny. Findings show that environmental litigation leads to temporary reductions in pollution and affects firm performance during legal proceedings. However, pollution levels rebound postlitigation, with no significant effect at anytime on infant mortality. This highlights the limited efficacy of judicial environmental interventions in highly polluted contexts like India.

Keywords: development, pollution, infant mortality, environmental justice, India, law

JEL Classification: Q53, Q56, C36, K32, K40

Suggested Citation

Bhupatiraju, Sandeep and Chen, Daniel and Joshi, Shareen and Neis, Peter and Singh, Shashank, Environmental Litigation as Scrutiny: A Four Decade Analysis of Justice, Firms, and Pollution in India (October 31, 2024). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5013333 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5013333

Sandeep Bhupatiraju

World Bank ( email )

Daniel Chen

University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) ( email )

Shareen Joshi (Contact Author)

Georgetown University ( email )

Washington, DC 20057
United States

Peter Neis

Université Clermont Auvergne ( email )

Shashank Singh

University of California Berkeley, Haas School of Business ( email )

United States

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