Corporate Actions as Moral Issues

25 Pages Posted: 8 Jan 2025 Last revised: 18 Mar 2026

See all articles by Zwetelina Iliewa

Zwetelina Iliewa

University of Bonn - Department of Economics

Elisabeth Kempf

Harvard University - Business School (HBS); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Oliver G. Spalt

University of Mannheim - Business School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: February 03, 2026

Abstract

We examine nonpecuniary preferences across a broad set of corporate actions using a representative sample of the U.S. population. Our core findings, based on large-scale online surveys, are that (i) self-reported nonpecuniary concerns are large both for stock market investors and non-investors; (ii) concerns about the treatment of workers and CEO pay rank highest—higher than concerns about workforce diversity and fossil energy usage; (iii) Moral Foundations Theory emerges as an important framework for explaining nonpecuniary preferences. Combined, our findings provide new evidence on the importance of moral values as a key determinant of nonpecuniary preferences over corporate actions.

Suggested Citation

Iliewa, Zwetelina and Kempf, Elisabeth and Spalt, Oliver G., Corporate Actions as Moral Issues (February 03, 2026). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5063396 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5063396

Zwetelina Iliewa

University of Bonn - Department of Economics ( email )

Adenauerallee 24-42
Bonn, 53113
Germany

Elisabeth Kempf (Contact Author)

Harvard University - Business School (HBS) ( email )

Boston, MA 02163
United States

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Oliver G. Spalt

University of Mannheim - Business School ( email )

L5, 5
Mannheim, 68131
Germany

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

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