Estimating the Impact of the Pay-As-You-Throw Program on Waste Reduction: Using MTE Analysis

45 Pages Posted: 8 Sep 2025 Last revised: 2 Mar 2026

See all articles by Tsuyoshi Goto

Tsuyoshi Goto

Chiba University

Kai Nomura

Yamanashi Eiwa College

Hiroki Kato

Aoyama Gakuin University

Date Written: August 28, 2025

Abstract

This paper investigates the waste reduction effect of the pay-as-you-throw (PAYT) program, which charges households for non-recyclable household waste, while accounting for self-selection into treatment. To address self-selection bias and heterogeneous treatment effects related to municipalities’ willingness to adopt PAYT, we estimate the marginal treatment effect (MTE) using the fiscal condition of municipalities as an instrumental variable, since fiscally constrained municipalities tend to adopt PAYT even though residents’ waste disposal behavior is not directly influenced by fiscal condition.
By estimating the MTE, we find that PAYT promotes recycling and reduces household waste for most municipalities, but the recycle-promoting effect of PAYT is limited for municipalities with less willingness to adopt PAYT. We also find that PAYT does not reduce total waste when business-related waste is considered, because PAYT induces immoral disposal: residents facing PAYT dispose household waste as business-related waste at shops and firms with public trash cans. Moreover, we show that the further marginal expansion of PAYT will not lead to additional waste reduction or the promotion of recycling.

Suggested Citation

Goto, Tsuyoshi and Nomura, Kai and Kato, Hiroki, Estimating the Impact of the Pay-As-You-Throw Program on Waste Reduction: Using MTE Analysis (August 28, 2025). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5411144 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5411144

Tsuyoshi Goto (Contact Author)

Chiba University ( email )

1-33, Yayoi-cho
Inage-ku
Chiba, 263-8522
Japan

HOME PAGE: http://gt510244goto.wixsite.com/website

Kai Nomura

Yamanashi Eiwa College

Hiroki Kato

Aoyama Gakuin University ( email )

4-4-25 Shibuya, Shibuya-ku
Tokyo, 150-8366
Japan

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