Scrappy or Strategic? Law Firm Decision-Making in Light of Executive Orders

Vol 13, Emory Corp. Gov. & Accountability Review (2026)

79 Pages Posted: 15 Sep 2025 Last revised: 22 May 2026

See all articles by Nancy B. Rapoport

Nancy B. Rapoport

University of Nevada, Las Vegas, William S. Boyd School of Law

Date Written: August 30, 2025

Abstract

Some of President Donald J. Trump’s early 2025 Executive Orders targeted specific law firms.  These Executive Orders have created a stir within our legal community.  Why did some firms fight those Executive Orders and other firms agree to quick settlements with the Trump administration?  In this article, I use some rudimentary concepts taken from game theory (as in, “I won’t use numbers or mathematical proofs,” so I expect actual game theorists to roll their eyes at my analysis) to analyze two games:  the game of “who within the firm will decide whether to fight or settle” and the game of “whether our firm should fight or settle.”  I conclude that Paul, Weiss’s decision to settle with the Trump administration was a foregone conclusion, given the structure and values of BigLaw, and that the other firms that settled were factoring in that a united front was a pipe dream.

Suggested Citation

Rapoport, Nancy B., Scrappy or Strategic? Law Firm Decision-Making in Light of Executive Orders (August 30, 2025). Vol 13, Emory Corp. Gov. & Accountability Review (2026), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5420374 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5420374

Nancy B. Rapoport (Contact Author)

University of Nevada, Las Vegas, William S. Boyd School of Law ( email )

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713-202-1881 (Phone)
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HOME PAGE: http://www.law.unlv.edu

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