Quantifying Investor Pressure

50 Pages Posted: 9 Mar 2026

Date Written: February 10, 2026

Abstract

How do investor preferences translate to changes in firm actions? We develop a firm-, time-, and topic-specific measure of investor preferences and their divergence from firm priorities using earnings call transcripts. This measure, which we call the "focus gap," captures the difference in attention to a given topic between the Q&A, which proxies for investor priorities, and the firm's presentation, which reflects firm executives' priorities. We show that the focus gap predicts firm actions. Specifically, a one standard deviation increase in the dividend focus gap is associated with a 0.4 p.p., or 4%, increase in dividends paid as a percent of firm market value within two years. The analogous repurchase focus gap raises repurchases made as a percent of firm market value by 0.3 p.p., or 2%, within one year, but reverts to zero by two years after the focus gap increase. We then develop a conceptual framework that generates two possible rationales for responsiveness to investor pressure: catering to increase short-term stock prices and learning about long-run value. Variation in incentives to cater to analysts suggests that catering to raise stock prices, as opposed to learning, drives responsiveness to the focus gap for dividend issuance and repurchases. Consistent with this interpretation, we find that focus gap-driven capital allocation decisions are associated with temporary stock price increases followed by subsequent reversals.

Keywords: investor pressure, governance, corporate payout policy

Suggested Citation

Robinson, Sarah and Walsh, Jennifer, Quantifying Investor Pressure (February 10, 2026). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6255839 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.6255839

Sarah Robinson (Contact Author)

Harvard University ( email )

1875 Cambridge Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Jennifer Walsh

Harvard Business School ( email )

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
66
Abstract Views
224
Rank
942,565
PlumX Metrics