When Tax Shields Shrink: Interest Deductibility Limitations and Corporate Innovation

56 Pages Posted: 24 Apr 2026

See all articles by Xinru Chen

Xinru Chen

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Mara Faccio

Mitchell E. Daniels, Jr School of Business, Purdue University; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Stefano Manfredonia

Fordham University

Jin Xu

Virginia Tech - Pamplin College of Business

Date Written: April 22, 2026

Abstract

We investigate how limiting interest deductibility, as mandated by the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, shapes corporate innovation. Using alternative identification strategies, we show that, relative to unaffected firms, affected firms experience significant declines in patent quantity and quality, and narrow the technological scope of their patent portfolios. Crosscountry evidence from the enactment of interest-ceiling rules confirms similar effects. The limitation increases firms' tax burden and, more substantially, induces deleveraging, curtailing their capacity for innovative investment. This exposes a novel financing channel linking corporate taxation to innovation, with the debt tax shield functioning as an implicit subsidy.

Keywords: Corporate Taxes, Corporate Innovation, Limitations on Interest Deductibility

Suggested Citation

Chen, Xinru and Faccio, Mara and Manfredonia, Stefano and Xu, Jin, When Tax Shields Shrink: Interest Deductibility Limitations and Corporate Innovation (April 22, 2026). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6632258 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.6632258

Xinru Chen

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Mara Faccio

Mitchell E. Daniels, Jr School of Business, Purdue University ( email )

403 Mitch Daniels Blvd.
West Lafayette, IN 47907
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org

Stefano Manfredonia (Contact Author)

Fordham University ( email )

113 West 60th Street
New York, NY 10023
United States

Jin Xu

Virginia Tech - Pamplin College of Business ( email )

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