Incentivizing Environmental Public Goods: Evidence from Urban Greening in China

85 Pages Posted: 30 Apr 2026

See all articles by Ding Ma

Ding Ma

Peking University - National School of Development

Zhiren Hu

Cornell University - Charles H. Dyson School of Applied Economics and Management

Xintong Li

University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - Rady School of Management

Date Written: March 30, 2026

Abstract

China's rapid surge in urban greening in recent years presents a puzzling deviation from global patterns. We document three stylized facts. Urban greening was stable from 2001 to 2013 but expanded rapidly afterward, coinciding with China's air pollution control efforts. More polluted cities experienced faster greening growth, and greening disproportionately occurred near air quality monitoring stations. These patterns suggest that urban greening partly reflects a strategic response by local governments to air pollution control mandates. The economic benefits of urban greening amount to approximately 1.13 trillion CNY per year, exceeding program costs. Our results suggest that top-down air pollution control reshaped local government incentives, improving the provision of environmental public goods and social welfare.

Keywords: Public Goods, Air Pollution, Environmental Regulation, Strategic Behavior JEL Codes: O13, Q53, Q57, R11, R52

Suggested Citation

Ma, Ding and Hu, Zhiren and Li, Xintong, Incentivizing Environmental Public Goods: Evidence from Urban Greening in China (March 30, 2026). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6685201 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.6685201

Ding Ma

Peking University - National School of Development ( email )

Beijing, 100871
China

Zhiren Hu (Contact Author)

Cornell University - Charles H. Dyson School of Applied Economics and Management ( email )

Ithaca, NY
United States

Xintong Li

University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - Rady School of Management ( email )

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