Constitutions as Credible Constraints on Despots

Abstract

Powerful and unconstrained leaders often hinder the development of their nations. This phenomenon has often been linked to the commitment issues that result from the lack of constraints facing such leaders. Therefore, restricting the powers of such leaders through constitutions has been widely considered as a potential solution to these issues. Nonetheless, it remains unclear when the de jure stipulations of a constitution would translate into de facto constraints on a powerful leader, particularly when these constraints rely on enforcement by other self-interested actors who can be swayed through bribery or threats of violence. Through a theoretical model I investigate what characteristics ensure that constitutions provide credible constraints on a powerful leader. Specifically, I emphasize the role of constitutions in incentivizing opposition against a leader, and the challenge of designing them to fulfill two conflicting objectives. My investigation reveals why similar constitutions may not always be respected when implemented in different contexts. Moreover, it also reveals a link between majority decision rules and transparency in voting, which helps explain the prevalence of these characteristics in modern constitutions.

Keywords: Executive constraints, Constitutions, Commitment, Credibility, Taxes