Optimal Monetary Policy with Imperfect Common Knowledge

Posted: 27 Oct 2005

See all articles by Klaus Adam

Klaus Adam

University of Mannheim; European Central Bank (ECB) - Department of Research; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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Abstract

This paper determines optimal nominal demand policy in a flexible price economy in which firms pay limited attention to aggregate variables. Firms' inattentiveness gives rise to idiosyncratic information errors and imperfect common knowledge about the shocks hitting the economy. This is shown to have strong implications for optimal nominal demand policy. In particular, if firms' prices are strategic complements and economic shocks display little persistence, monetary policy has strong real effects, making it optimal to stabilize the output gap. Weak complementarities and sufficient shock persistence, however, cause price level stabilization to become increasingly optimal. With persistent shocks, optimal monetary policy shifts from output gap stabilization in initial periods following the shock to price level stabilization in later periods, potentially rationalizing the medium-term approach to price stability adopted by some central banks.

Keywords: Private information, rational inattention, Shannon capacity, nominal demand management, information imperfections

JEL Classification: E31, E52, D82

Suggested Citation

Adam, Klaus, Optimal Monetary Policy with Imperfect Common Knowledge. Journal of Monetary Economics, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=827288

Klaus Adam (Contact Author)

University of Mannheim ( email )

Department of Economics
L7 ,3-5
Mannheim, 68131
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://adam.vwl.uni-mannheim.de/1528.0.html

European Central Bank (ECB) - Department of Research ( email )

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Germany
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Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

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United Kingdom

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