Democracy and Protectionism

33 Pages Posted: 25 May 2006 Last revised: 23 Dec 2022

See all articles by Kevin H. O'Rourke

Kevin H. O'Rourke

University of Dublin, Trinity College; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Alan M. Taylor

Columbia University; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: May 2006

Abstract

Does democracy encourage free trade? It depends. Broadening the franchise involves transferring power from non-elected elites to the wider population, most of whom will be workers. The Hecksher-Ohlin-Stolper-Samuelson logic says that democratization should lead to more liberal trade policies in countries where workers stand to gain from free trade; and to more protectionist policies in countries where workers will benefit from the imposition of tariffs and quotas. We test and confirm these political economy implications of trade theory hypothesis using data on democracy, factor endowments, and protection in the late nineteenth century.

Suggested Citation

O'Rourke, Kevin H. and Taylor, Alan M., Democracy and Protectionism (May 2006). NBER Working Paper No. w12250, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=903888

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University of Dublin, Trinity College ( email )

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