Download This PaperPartial Passive Ownership Holdings, Licensing and Taxation
13 Pages Posted: 19 Mar 2021
Date Written: March 18, 2021
Abstract
We consider a homogenous good Cournot duopoly, in which a firm owns a
cost-reducing technology and has a non-controlling share over its rival. We
show that partial passive ownership holdings may induce licensing via a
fixed fee and increase consumer surplus, tax revenues, and social welfare.
Moreover, a decrease in the ad valorem tax may also facilitate licensing and
increase welfare.
Keywords: partial passive ownership, licensing, ad valorem tax, fixed fee,
JEL Classification: L10, L24, L41,
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Leonardos, Stefanos and Petrakis, Emmanuel and Skartados, Panagiotis and Stamatopoulos, Giorgos, Partial Passive Ownership Holdings, Licensing and Taxation (March 18, 2021). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3807133 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3807133
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