Download This PaperOn Punishment, Bribery and Government Performance
19 Pages Posted: 14 Mar 2013 Last revised: 30 Apr 2014
Date Written: August 2013
Abstract
The paper identifies the relative utility of government and voters to define the threshold for working or not. It accepts for a finite move game, non-performance of the incumbent, and shows how such a behavior can be reversed in the presence of bribery and punishment in the form of loss of office and utility of the incumbent. Consequently, eight possible SPNE are identified, each contingent on relative utility rankings, rent from holding office, per unit rent and punishment co-efficient.
Keywords: Non-performance, incumbency, bribery, punishment, SPNE
JEL Classification: D72, D73
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Chatterjee, Bibaswan, On Punishment, Bribery and Government Performance (August 2013). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2232910 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2232910
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