Amendment of the Japanese Constitution ― A Comparative Law Approach

NANZAN REVIEW OF AMERICAN STUDIES, Volume 37 (2015): 51-70

20 Pages Posted: 19 Jun 2017

See all articles by Yuichiro Tsuji

Yuichiro Tsuji

Meiji University Graduate School of Law; University of Tsukuba; Waseda University - School of Social Science

Date Written: June 16, 2017

Abstract

It has been argued that it is more difficult to amend the Japanese Constitution than the U.S. Constitution. To effect a recent change in the Japanese Constitution, on July 1, 2014, Prime Minister Abe Shinzo announced a modification of the interpretation of Article 9 of the Constitution by way of a cabinet decision. Other imminent plans to revise the Constitution are Abe’s planned amendments to revise sections related to defense powers in 2015. Using a comparative law approach, this article examines these two efforts to revise the Japanese Constitution in a broad review of whether now is the time to amend the Constitution. It is said that the interpretation of the Japanese Constitution is too complicated for the general public to understand. A Japanese Constitutional scholar’s duty is to solve this difficult question and bridge the gap between ordinary life and texts of legal statutes, and the Japanese Constitution.

It is incorrect to say that it is difficult to amend the Japanese Constitution, and easy to amend the U.S. Constitution, as the current comparative review shows. The U.S. President has veto power over the Congress for statutes, but not for the Constitutional amendment. The federal and state legislature are exclusively engaged; and the U.S. president cannot dissolve the legislative bodies. In Japan, a bill to amend the Japanese Constitution must be submitted by each house of the Diet. The Japanese Constitution does not have a federalism system. Chapter 8 recently provided for the autonomy of local governments in the Japanese Constitution. The Cabinet is eligible to submit a bill for statutes, but local government has no role in amending the Constitution except under Article 95. Under the Japanese Constitution, there is dissolution of the House of Representatives under the parliamentary system. Japanese constitutional researchers think it is necessary to dissolve the Diet to ask the will of the people in cases where the issues were not reviewed by the people when the representatives are elected. It is not simple to compare these two different systems. One common characteristic is that election by the people is the base of democracy, and people vote to show their wills. As a difference between the two, under Japan’s parliamentary system, the Cabinet has exercised the power to dissolve the parliament under Article 7. Does Japan struggle with the amendment of its Constitution, compared with the U.S.? The Japanese Constitution lists fundamental rights in Articles 10 to 40 and is understood to limit and protect against the arbitrary and capricious exercise of power, creating a system of government called Constitutionalism. The people’s sovereignty is the principle that the people decide and accept their governing decisions, even though they may be found to be wrong in the long run, bound by Constitution. The decisions rendered by the courts are also a part of law, binding the judges as case law, as the rule of law. The supreme power to interpret the Constitution is not with the Cabinet, but with the Japanese Supreme Court. Public announcements by the CBL must work objectively in the long term and are not subject to political power. The Japanese Supreme Court is expected to send messages through its decisions to gain the confidence of the people, bridging the gap between the judiciary and the general public. Japanese Constitutional scholars have often been asked if they have cultivated discussions on amendments to the Constitution. This is something that only Japanese Constitutional scholars can do in order to bridge the gap between the public and the Constitution.

Suggested Citation

Tsuji, Yuichiro, Amendment of the Japanese Constitution ― A Comparative Law Approach (June 16, 2017). NANZAN REVIEW OF AMERICAN STUDIES, Volume 37 (2015): 51-70, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2987659

Yuichiro Tsuji (Contact Author)

Meiji University Graduate School of Law ( email )

1-1 Kanda-Surugadai
Tokyo, 101-8301
Japan

HOME PAGE: http://researchmap.jp/TSUJI/

University of Tsukuba ( email )

Tsukuba University , Ibaraki Ken
Tsukuba, Ibaraki 305-8573, Ibaraki 3050006
Japan

Waseda University - School of Social Science ( email )

1-6-1 Nishiwaseda
Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 169-8050
Japan

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