Creative Delinquency or Destructive Selfishness?

International Journal of Production Research, 56 (1-2), 2018, 783–794.

37 Pages Posted: 24 Apr 2020

See all articles by Haihong Yu

Haihong Yu

School of Maritime and Transportation, Ningbo University

Suresh Sethi

University of Texas at Dallas - Naveen Jindal School of Management

Xi Shan

University of Texas at Dallas, Naveen Jindal School of Management, Students

Date Written: March 30, 2020

Abstract

We study two competing firms with different production costs and moral standards making decisions to sell their products in the market by choosing their optimal production quantities and degrees of disobedience of a guiding rule imposed by a regulatory authority such as the government. We model this problem as a Cournot–Nash game in which. We introduce rules unfairness as a behavioural factor at work. We answer the questions of why firms disobey rules and to what degree and what are the effects of such actions. Our results show that firms disobey the rules for self-interest and harm other incentives. The case when the firms’ disobediences can improve the total surplus (sum of their profits) is referred to as creative delinquency, whereas destructive selfishness refers to situation in which one’s behaviour only benefits self and leads to a decreased total surplus. Our results indicate that rules unfairness could be beneficial in some cases. Finally, our derivation of the optimal decision rules allows a regulatory authority to put into effect a coordinated punishment strategies that can benefit one firm or both firms.

Keywords: disobedience; behavioural factors; moral standard; optimal rules; Cournot game

JEL Classification: C61, M11, M20

Suggested Citation

Yu, Haihong and Sethi, Suresh and Shan, Xi, Creative Delinquency or Destructive Selfishness? (March 30, 2020). International Journal of Production Research, 56 (1-2), 2018, 783–794., Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3564692

Haihong Yu

School of Maritime and Transportation, Ningbo University ( email )

China

Suresh Sethi (Contact Author)

University of Texas at Dallas - Naveen Jindal School of Management ( email )

800 W. Campbell Road, SM30
Richardson, TX 75080-3021
United States

Xi Shan

University of Texas at Dallas, Naveen Jindal School of Management, Students ( email )

P.O. Box 830688
Richardson, TX 75083-0688
United States

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