A Review of Dynamic Stackelberg Game Models
Discrete and Continuous Dynamical Systems - Series B (DCDS-B), 22(1), 2017, 125-159
Posted: 24 Apr 2020
Date Written: 2017
Abstract
Dynamic Stackelberg game models have been used to study sequential decision making in noncooperative games in various fields. In this paper we give relevant dynamic Stackelberg game models, and review their applications to operations management and marketing channels. A common feature of these applications is the specification of the game structure: a decentralized channel consists of a manufacturer and independent retailers, and a sequential decision process with a state dynamics. In operations management, Stackelberg games have been used to study inventory issues, such as wholesale and retail pricing strategies, outsourcing, and learning effects in dynamic environments. The underlying demand typically has a growing trend or seasonal variation. In marketing, dynamic Stackelberg games have been used to model cooperative advertising programs, store brand and national brand advertising strategies, shelf space allocation, and pricing and advertising decisions. The demand dynamics are usually extensions of the classic advertising capital models or sales-advertising response models. We begin each section by introducing the relevant dynamic Stackelberg game formulation along with the definition of the equilibrium used, and then review the models and results appearing in the literature.
Keywords: Dynamic game, Stackelberg game, Nash game, non-cooperative game, operations management, marketing, open-loop equilibrium, feedback equilibrium, maximum principle, time consistency.
JEL Classification: C61, M11, M20, M31
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