Property Rights, Expropriations, and Business Cycles in China

46 Pages Posted: 24 Apr 2020 Last revised: 26 Feb 2021

See all articles by Yin Germaschewski

Yin Germaschewski

University of New Hampshire

Jaroslav Horvath

University of New Hampshire

Loris Rubini

University of New Hampshire

Date Written: September 22, 2020

Abstract

Real business cycles in China are different than in many other countries, including consumption being more volatile than output and uncorrelated with investment. To study whether Chinese institutions can account for these features, we expand the standard real business cycle model with private and state-owned enterprises facing time-to-build constraints, expropriations, and government expenditures. We introduce shocks to each of these activities and estimate our model with Bayesian techniques. The model matches the salient data moments quite closely, with expropriations playing a central role. In particular, shocks to expropriations account for over 70% of consumption and output volatility, and over 60% of private investment volatility. To assess whether our estimated expropriations are empirically plausible, we show that: (i) the model-generated expropriation series is highly correlated with a commonly used measure of property rights; (ii) the explanatory power of expropriations drops considerably after 2012, coinciding with the government's anti-corruption campaign; and (iii) a placebo test estimating the model for the U.S. finds expropriations to be about an eight of those in China, and to account for only a small share of the U.S. aggregate fluctuations.

Keywords: Real Business Cycles, Property Rights, Expropriations, the Chinese Economy

JEL Classification: E32, O43, O53

Suggested Citation

Germaschewski, Yin and Horvath, Jaroslav and Rubini, Loris, Property Rights, Expropriations, and Business Cycles in China (September 22, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3565144 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3565144

Yin Germaschewski

University of New Hampshire ( email )

Durham, NH 03824
United States
6038623369 (Phone)
6038623369 (Fax)

Jaroslav Horvath (Contact Author)

University of New Hampshire ( email )

Department of Economics
10 Garrison Avenue
Durham, NH 03824
United States
6038620867 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/jaroslavjayhorvath/

Loris Rubini

University of New Hampshire ( email )

NH
United States

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