Profit Persistence in the U.S. Audit Market

Journal of Accounting Research, 0[10.1111/1475-679X.70029]

60 Pages Posted: 20 Apr 2020 Last revised: 9 Dec 2025

See all articles by Will Ciconte

Will Ciconte

School of Business, University of Kansas; University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign - Department of Accountancy; University of Florida - Fisher School of Accounting

Andrew Kitto

University of Massachusetts Amherst

Date Written: November 12, 2025

Abstract

This study investigates the relation between audit competition, audit quality, and auditor labor hours. Using proprietary data on auditor realization rates, we construct new measures of competition based on theory predicting that abnormal profits will quickly disappear when competition is high but persist over multiple periods when competition is low. We find consistent evidence of persistent abnormal profits among U.S. Big 4 engagements and that individual offices earn persistent abnormal returns suggesting that the market is not perfectly competitive. Examining the consequences of lower competition, we find that profit persistence is negatively related to audit hours and positively related to audit quality. Although we are cautious about inferring causality, our findings suggest that lower competition is associated with more efficient and effective audits.

Keywords: audit firm competition, profit persistence, audit market concentration, audit quality

JEL Classification: D43, L84, M41, M42

Suggested Citation

Ciconte, Will and Kitto, Andrew, Profit Persistence in the U.S. Audit Market (November 12, 2025). Journal of Accounting Research, 0[10.1111/1475-679X.70029], Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3565193 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1475-679X.70029

Will Ciconte

School of Business, University of Kansas ( email )

1654 Naismith Dr
Lawrence, KS 66045
United States

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign - Department of Accountancy ( email )

1206 South Sixth Street
Champaign, IL 61820
United States

University of Florida - Fisher School of Accounting ( email )

PO Box 117165, 201 Stuzin Hall
Gainesville, FL 32610-0496
United States

Andrew Kitto (Contact Author)

University of Massachusetts Amherst ( email )

Amherst, MA 01003-4910
United States

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