The Implication of Vendor Inventory Liability Period in a Decentralised Assembly System

International Journal of Production Research, 54(17), 5029-5044, 2016

Posted: 25 Apr 2020

See all articles by Xu (Gavin) Guan

Xu (Gavin) Guan

School of Management, Huazhong University of Science and Technology

Guo Li

University of Texas at Dallas; Beijing Institute of Technology

Suresh Sethi

University of Texas at Dallas - Naveen Jindal School of Management

Date Written: 2016

Abstract

This paper investigates a decentralized assembly system that consists of one manufacturer and multiple suppliers who produce the complementary components. In a single selling season, the manufacturer initially sets a vendor inventory liability period (VILP) to control the suppliers’ delivery times, and the suppliers simultaneously determine when to deliver their components. Given the firms’ equilibrium strategies, we find that it is not wise for the manufacturer to set an overly long VILP, since having no inventory is not always beneficial to the manufacturer. A supplier may choose to postpone his delivery when the length of the VILP increases or the other suppliers’ deliveries are delayed, and either of these conditions is detrimental to the supplier’s profitability. We also examine the impact of VILP under different situations and find that having VILPs customized for different suppliers can reduce the manufacturer’s cost as well as improve the supply chain’s overall efficiency.

Keywords: Assembly System; Vendor Inventory Liability Period; Game Theory; Coordination

JEL Classification: C61, M11, M20, C40, C10, D83

Suggested Citation

Guan, Xu and Li, Guo and Sethi, Suresh, The Implication of Vendor Inventory Liability Period in a Decentralised Assembly System (2016). International Journal of Production Research, 54(17), 5029-5044, 2016, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3565449

Xu Guan

School of Management, Huazhong University of Science and Technology ( email )

Huazhong University of Science and Technology
School of Management
Wuhan
China

Guo Li

University of Texas at Dallas ( email )

2601 North Floyd Road
Richardson, TX 75083
United States

Beijing Institute of Technology ( email )

5 South Zhongguancun street
Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Researc
Beijing, Haidian District 100081
China

Suresh Sethi (Contact Author)

University of Texas at Dallas - Naveen Jindal School of Management ( email )

800 W. Campbell Road, SM30
Richardson, TX 75080-3021
United States

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