Download This PaperConfessionalism in Lebanon: The Costs of Seeking Consensus Through Fragmentation
24 Pages Posted: 27 Apr 2020 Last revised: 10 Jul 2020
Date Written: April 1, 2020
Abstract
Confessional political systems are exceptional in that they seek to build consensus by reinforcing fragmentation of disparate groups. Such a tension is most evident in the case of Lebanon. The country’s creation and history make it an interesting case study demonstrating the limitations of a confessional system. While most academics focus on the substantive merits of such a system and the theory of its creation, this paper goes a different route. Instead, applied law and economics principles provide insights on the effectiveness (or lack thereof) of confessionalism. This essay begins by outlining the modern history of Lebanon. The following subparts shine light on the usefulness of economic theory to better critique confessionalism. Part II uses bargain theory and voting rules to demonstrate how the infamous Lebanese Troika can be reconfigured to reach more efficient government. Additionally, it argues that familism consolidates power within the political ruling class, but simultaneously lowers the transaction costs of bargaining at the expense of damaging democratic institutions. Part III discusses elections, representation, and intransitive voting, demonstrating that the country’s system breeds inefficiency, while showing that representation error undermines the ideas behind a confessionalist system. Part IV explains how entrenchment reinforces a status quo that externalizes costs to everyday citizens, while allowing the ruling class to internalize all the benefits. Ultimately, these economic principles provide a new perspective on how to view confessional systems and illustrate why change is in needed in Lebanon.
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Kareem Ramadan (Contact Author)
University of Virginia - School of Law, Alumnus or Degree Candidate Author ( email )
580 Massie Road
Charlottesville, VA 22903
United States