Market Power, Competition and Innovation in Digital Markets: A Survey

34 Pages Posted: 18 Feb 2020 Last revised: 2 Apr 2020

See all articles by Emilio Calvano

Emilio Calvano

Luiss Guido Carli University - Department of Economics and Finance; Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF); University of Toulouse 1 - Department of Economics

Michele Polo

Bocconi University - Department of Economics

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Date Written: December 1, 2019

Abstract

This article focuses on the economics of digital markets with particular emphasis on those features that are commonly deemed critical for Antitrust. Digital markets are often concentrated due to network effects and due to the need of large amounts of Data for production. We review papers characterizing the nature of social harms caused by market power and the role of competition FOR the market and IN the market to relief some of that harm. Special emphasis is given to the role of (i) human attention (which is monetized and is a key input in advertising markets), (ii) Data (which is the oil that powers these markets) and (iii) innovation (incentives, entry for buyout and killer acquisitions).

Keywords: Digital Markets, Economics of attention, Innovation, killer acquisitions, network effects

JEL Classification: L1, L4

Suggested Citation

Calvano, Emilio and Polo, Michele, Market Power, Competition and Innovation in Digital Markets: A Survey (December 1, 2019). Information Economics and Policy, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3523611 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3523611

Emilio Calvano (Contact Author)

Luiss Guido Carli University - Department of Economics and Finance ( email )

Viale di Villa Massimo, 57
Rome, 00161
Italy

Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF) ( email )

Via Due Macelli, 73
Rome, 00187
Italy

University of Toulouse 1 - Department of Economics ( email )

Place Anatole-France
Toulouse Cedex, F-31042
France

Michele Polo

Bocconi University - Department of Economics ( email )

Via Gobbi 5
Milan, 20136
Italy

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