Download This PaperSetting a Good Example? The Effect of Leader and Peer Behavior on Corruption Among Indonesian Senior Civil Servants
Public Administration Review 79 (4): 565-579, July/August 2019
15 Pages Posted: 30 Apr 2020
Date Written: May 27, 2019
Abstract
Standard anticorruption interventions consist of intensified monitoring and sanctioning. Rooted in principal-agent theory, these interventions are based on the assumption that corrupt acts follow a rational cost-benefit calculation by gain-seeking individuals. Given their mixed results, however, these interventions require closer scrutiny. Building on goal-framing theory, the authors argue that rule compliance requires a salient normative goal frame, since monitoring can never be perfect. Being inherently brittle, it needs constant reinforcement through external cues operating alongside formal monitoring and sanctioning. Leaders and peers setting a good example can provide such cues. In line with this hypothesis, analysis of multilevel repeated measures data from a vignette study of 580 Indonesian senior civil servants shows that the perceived likelihood of a hypothetical civil servant accepting a bribe is lowest when monitoring and sanctioning are strong and when leaders and peers are known to have refused bribes in the past.
Keywords: Corruption, Agency Theory; Goal Framing Theory; Indonesia; Civil Servants; Factorial Survey
JEL Classification: D73; D23; H83, H76; L14; K42
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