Risk of Collusion: Will Groups of 3 Ruin the FIFA World Cup?

Journal of Sports Analytics, forthcoming

25 Pages Posted: 20 Jun 2018 Last revised: 2 Apr 2020

See all articles by Julien Guyon

Julien Guyon

Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées (ENPC); NYU Polytechnic School of Engineering - Department of Finance and Risk Engineering; Columbia University - Department of Mathematics

Date Written: April 21, 2019

Abstract

In 2026, the FIFA World Cup will for the first time gather 48 men's national teams. It will consist of a group stage made of 16 groups of three, with the best two teams in each group advancing to the knockout stage. Using groups of three raises several fairness issues, including risk of match fixing and schedule imbalance. In this article we examine the risk of collusion. The two teams who play the last game in the group know exactly what results will let them advance to the knockout stage. Suspicion of match fixing occurs when a result qualifies both of them at the expense of the third team of the group, and can seriously tarnish the tournament. We quantify how often this is expected to happen and explain how to build the match schedule so as to minimize the risk of collusion. We also quantify how the risk of collusion depends on competitive balance. Moreover, we show that forbidding draws during the group stage (a rule considered by FIFA) does not eliminate the risk of match fixing, and that surprisingly when draws are forbidden the 3-2-1-0 point system does not do a better job at decreasing the risk of collusion than the 3-0 point system. Finally we describe alternate formats for a 48 team World Cup that would eliminate or strongly decrease the risk of collusion.

Keywords: sports, tournament design, FIFA World Cup, groups of 3, match fixing, collusion, point system

Suggested Citation

Guyon, Julien, Risk of Collusion: Will Groups of 3 Ruin the FIFA World Cup? (April 21, 2019). Journal of Sports Analytics, forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3190779 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3190779

Julien Guyon (Contact Author)

Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées (ENPC) ( email )

28, rue des Saints-Peres
75343 Paris Cedex 07
France

NYU Polytechnic School of Engineering - Department of Finance and Risk Engineering ( email )

Brooklyn, NY 11201
United States

Columbia University - Department of Mathematics ( email )

3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States

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