Earnings Repatriation Tax Cost Risks and Bank Loan Contracting

62 Pages Posted: 4 Apr 2017 Last revised: 3 Mar 2026

See all articles by Zhiming Ma

Zhiming Ma

Peking University - Guanghua School of Management

Derrald Stice

The University of Hong Kong - School of Business; HKU Business School, The University of Hong Kong

Danye Wang

University of Iowa

Date Written: February 01, 2026

Abstract

Unlike purely domestic firms, multinational companies have distinctive opportunities to engage in sophisticated international tax planning strategies. This study investigates whether banks perceive potential earnings repatriation taxes as a significant source of risk when designing loan agreements for these firms. Our findings reveal that U.S. multinationals facing higher potential repatriation tax burdens are subject to wider loan spreads, indicating increased risk premiums. Moreover, this effect is especially pronounced among firms with low profitability or limited financial flexibility, highlighting the risk-sensitive nature of these loans. We also observe that lenders are more likely to demand collateral and impose stricter financial covenants in loans to firms with substantial repatriation tax exposure, further underscoring that banks regard these taxes as a firm-specific risk factor. By exploring the intersection of international tax considerations, potential earnings repatriation taxes here, and debt contracting, our research makes a valuable contribution to the literature, shedding light on how global tax issues influence credit markets and lending behavior.

Keywords: Debt Contracting, Earnings Repatriation Taxes, Tax Risk, Syndicated Loans, Multinational Firms

JEL Classification: G01, M4, H2, H25, K3, K34

Suggested Citation

Ma, Zhiming and Stice, Derrald and Wang, Danye,

Earnings Repatriation Tax Cost Risks and Bank Loan Contracting

(February 01, 2026). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2945324 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2945324

Zhiming Ma

Peking University - Guanghua School of Management ( email )

Peking University
Beijing, Beijing 100871
China

Derrald Stice (Contact Author)

The University of Hong Kong - School of Business ( email )

Meng Wah Complex
Pokfulam Road
Hong Kong
China

HKU Business School, The University of Hong Kong ( email )

Hong Kong
China

Danye Wang

University of Iowa ( email )

341 Schaeffer Hall
Iowa City, IA 52242-1097
United States

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