Do Compulsory Schooling Laws Always Work? A Study of Youth Crime in Brazilian Municipalities

52 Pages Posted: 6 Apr 2020 Last revised: 6 May 2025

See all articles by Marislei Nishijima

Marislei Nishijima

Institute of International Relations - University of Sao Paulo (USP) ; Institute of International Relations - University of Sao Paulo (USP)

Professor Sarmistha Pal

University of Surrey; University of Surrey; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Abstract

We examine if compulsory schooling laws (CSL) necessarily lower crimes. We focus on violent youth crime (homicides by assault and guns) among 15-19 years age group in all Brazilian municipalities over 2000-13, taking advantage of the 2009 Brazilian Constitutional Amendment that required introduction of compulsory high schooling of 15-17-year-olds by 2016. Only about 53% municipalities adopted the Amendment by 2013. Difference-in-difference estimates with municipality fixed effects to account for the endogenous adoption of the Amendment by municipalities show small treatment effects for homicides, but insignificant effects for homicide rates in the full sample. In the absence of any significant increase in income/employment among this age group, we attribute this to the incapacitation effect of CSL, which was, however, weakened by overcrowding in day and night schools in treated municipalities after 2009. In contrast, poorer treated municipalities witnessed increased class size, worse school performance and increased crime too. The crime reduction effects of CSL thus crucially depend on whether/how it affects class size and school quality especially in less promising jurisdictions.

Keywords: difference in differences model, school quality, Constitutional Amendment 59, compulsory schooling law, violent youth crime, endogenous adoption, Brazil

JEL Classification: H41, I21, K30, O15

Suggested Citation

Nishijima, Marislei and Nishijima, Marislei and Pal, Sarmistha, Do Compulsory Schooling Laws Always Work? A Study of Youth Crime in Brazilian Municipalities. IZA Discussion Paper No. 13097, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3568302

Marislei Nishijima (Contact Author)

Institute of International Relations - University of Sao Paulo (USP) ( email )

Av. Prof. Lúcio Martins Rodrigues, s/n, travessas
Cidade Universitária
Sao Paulo, SP 05508-020
Brazil
1130910526 (Phone)
1130910526 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://marislei.iri.usp.br/en/home-2/

Institute of International Relations - University of Sao Paulo (USP) ( email )

Av. Prof. Lúcio Martins Rodrigues, s/n, travessas
Cidade Universitária
São Paulo, São Paulo 05508-020
Brazil
+55(11) 3091-0526 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://marislei.iri.usp.br

Sarmistha Pal

University of Surrey ( email )

Guildford
Guildford, Surrey GU2 5XH
United Kingdom

University of Surrey ( email )

Stag Hill
Guildford, England GU2 7XH
United Kingdom
01483 683995 (Phone)

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

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