Shareholder activism in small-cap newly public firms
Financial Analysts Journal, 2024, 80(2): 52-73.
61 Pages Posted: 12 Jun 2019 Last revised: 25 Apr 2024
Date Written: November 10, 2023
Abstract
We examine a private dataset of engagements by a UK fund in small-cap newly-public firms. The fund inherits unwanted holdings from disparate investors and earns fees liquidating its portfolio. It considers activism only when blocks cannot be exited efficiently. Engagements are with firms that have Founder Chairmen or CEOs, other blockholders thought to be supportive, and few outside directors. Engagements are conducted behind-the-scenes, without involving other shareholders, are strikingly successful, and result in cumulative abnormal returns of 8-10% when objectives are met. The fund outperforms benchmarks and we estimate that abnormal returns derive mostly from engagements rather than stock picking.
Keywords: shareholder activism, corporate governance, institutional investors, small-caps, IPOs
JEL Classification: G23, G32, G34
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation

