Download This PaperConstitutional End Games: Making Presidential Term Limits Stick
61 Pages Posted: 1 May 2020
Date Written: 2020
Abstract
Presidential term limits are an important and common protection of constitutional democracy around the world. But they are often evaded because they raise particularly difficult compliance problems that we call “end game” problems. Because presidents have overwhelming incentives to remain in power, they may seek extraordinary means to evade term limits. Comparative experience shows that presidents rely on a wide range of devices, such as formal constitutional change, wholesale constitutional replacement, and manipulation of the judiciary to get around permanent bans on reelection. In this Article, we draw on this experience to show that, in many contexts, weaker bans on reelection for consecutive terms, rather than permanent bans on any reelection, are the best response to the end game problem. Would-be authoritarian presidents are more likely to comply with term limits that force a temporary exit from the presidency because they hold open the prospect of an eventual return to power. Furthermore, a ban on consecutive reelection will allow alternative political forces to strengthen and make substantial democratic erosion less likely. In this sense, the United States’ oft-cited presidential term limit, which allows two consecutive terms in office, but prohibits all future reelection, may not be the best model for preserving democracy.
Keywords: Term Limits, Democratic Backsliding, Constitutional Design, Executive Power
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Rosalind Dixon
University of New South Wales (UNSW) - UNSW Law & Justice ( email )
Kensington, New South Wales 2052
Australia
David Landau (Contact Author)
Florida State University - College of Law ( email )
425 W. Jefferson Street
Tallahassee, FL 32306
United States