Structural vs. Behavioural Remedies

Maier-Rigaud, Frank P.; Lörtscher, Benjamin

Structural vs. Behavioural Remedies

Maier-Rigaud, F. and B. Loertscher (2020) Structural vs. Behavioural Remedies, Competition Policy International, Forthcoming

11 Pages Posted: 30 Apr 2020

See all articles by Frank P. Maier-Rigaud

Frank P. Maier-Rigaud

IESEG School of Management (LEM-CNRS), Department of Economics and Quantitative Methods; ABC economics

Benjamin Lörtscher

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Date Written: April 6, 2020

Abstract

The European Commission’s remedial practice displays important differences in the type of remedies accepted in merger as opposed to antitrust cases. This paper briefly reviews the Commission’s remedies practice over the last 14 years highlighting the differences and discussing inconsistencies. It raises the question why predominantly behavioural remedies are chosen in antitrust cases and how this practice could be reconciled with the approach in merger control where the risks to effective competition are viewed as deriving from changes in the structure of the market and where therefore structural remedies are typically considered necessary.

Keywords: structural remedies, behavioural remedies, Article 7, Article 9, Merger remedies, access remedies, evolution of remedies, remedies practice, European Commission, consistency of remedies

JEL Classification: K21, L40

Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation

Maier-Rigaud, Frank P. and Lörtscher, Benjamin, Structural vs. Behavioural Remedies (April 6, 2020). Maier-Rigaud, F. and B. Loertscher (2020) Structural vs. Behavioural Remedies, Competition Policy International, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3569642