The Economic Role of Alliances during Industry Shocks

46 Pages Posted: 4 Jun 2020

Date Written: April 7, 2020

Abstract

The market for corporate control plays an important role during industry shocks. However, this market fails in the presence of asymmetric information. I investigate the consequences of market failures for efficient firms that face difficulties to adapt to shocks because of informational frictions. I propose that alliances are a valuable alternative for these firms because ownership-sharing ameliorates informational frictions that induce market failures. I report empirical evidence supporting this hypothesis. Valuation uncertainty and the cost to access external credit increases the odds of establishing alliances during shocks and these alliances create more value than alliances announced in other periods.

Keywords: Alliances, Industry shocks, Mergers and acquisitions

JEL Classification: G34, D23

Suggested Citation

Mantecon, Tomas, The Economic Role of Alliances during Industry Shocks (April 7, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3570272 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3570272

Tomas Mantecon (Contact Author)

University of North Texas ( email )

1155 Union Circle #305340
Denton, TX 76203
United States

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