Competition Law As Common Law: American Express and the Evolution of Antitrust

antitrust, two-sided markets, platforms, rule of reason, common law

62 Pages Posted: 12 May 2020 Last revised: 28 May 2020

See all articles by A. Douglas Melamed

A. Douglas Melamed

Stanford Law School

Michael L. Katz

Haas School of Business; University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics

Date Written: May 26, 2020

Abstract

We explore the implications of the widely accepted understanding that competition law is common — or “judge-made” — law. Specifically, we ask how the rule of reason in antitrust law should be shaped and implemented, not just to guide correct application of existing law to the facts of a case, but also to enable courts to participate constructively in the common law-like evolution of antitrust law in the light of changes in economic learning and business and judicial experience. We explore these issues in the context of a recently decided case, Ohio v. American Express, and conclude that the Supreme Court did not apply the rule of reason in a way that enabled an effective common law-like evolution of antitrust law.

Keywords: Antitrust Law, Common Law, Credit Cards, Supreme Court, Rule of Reason, Ohio v American Express, Apple v Pepper

JEL Classification: L10, L12, L13, L14, L40, L41, L42

Suggested Citation

Melamed, Doug and Katz, Michael L., Competition Law As Common Law: American Express and the Evolution of Antitrust (May 26, 2020). antitrust, two-sided markets, platforms, rule of reason, common law, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3570997

Doug Melamed

Stanford Law School ( email )

559 Nathan Abbott Way
Stanford, CA 94305-8610
United States

Michael L. Katz (Contact Author)

Haas School of Business ( email )

Berkeley, CA 94720
United States

University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics ( email )

579 Evans Hall
Berkeley, CA 94709
United States

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