Liability Insurance: Equilibrium Contracts under Monopoly and Competition

In liability lawsuits (e.g. patent infringement) a plaintiff demands compensation from a defendant and the parties often negotiate a settlement to avoid a costly trial. Liability insurance creates bargaining leverage for the defendant in this settlement negotiation. We study the characteristics of equilibrium contracts in settings where this leverage effect is a substantial source of value for insurance. Our results show that under adverse selection, a monopolist offers at most two contracts, which under-insure low-risk types and may inefficiently induce high-risk types to litigate. In a competitive market, only a pooling equilibrium with under-insurance may exist.

Keywords: bargaining, adverse selection, liability, litigation, insurance, competitive equilibrium, monopoly

JEL Classification: C7, D82, G22, K1, K41

Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation

Lemus, Jorge and Temnyalov, Emil and Turner, John L., Liability Insurance: Equilibrium Contracts under Monopoly and Competition (March 24, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3275814 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3275814