Antitrust Reform: Implications of Prospective Threats by Digital Platforms to Relocate Abroad

"Antitrust Reform: Implications of Prospective Threats by Digital Platforms to Relocate Abroad" (2020) Belmont Law Review Vol. 8(1)

27 Pages Posted: 4 Jun 2020 Last revised: 19 Nov 2020

See all articles by Jeff Bone

Jeff Bone

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Pembroke - School of Business

Date Written: April 12, 2020

Abstract

Facebook, Amazon, Apple, and Alphabet (Google) are four of the world’s most expansive business empires, both in terms of public visibility and market value. This paper examines a hypothetical scenario. If Congress introduced a bill to enact new antitrust regulations over digital platforms, what would happen if these companies responded by threatening an expatriation of some or all of their U.S. business assets? It is argued in this paper that if these companies threatened a costly and unpopular expatriation of business, that the U.S. Congress will capitulate to their demands. If true, these companies have reached a critical threshold of market concentration that poses a threat to democracy because domestic governance and control cannot rein them in. Further, it suggests that the global span and prodigious growth of these companies has dwarfed the ability of political institutions to hold them to account. The paper ends with a proposed solution using Google as a case study example. The proposal calls for the implementation of a corporate monitor program pursuant to a deferred prosecution agreement between the Department of Justice and Google.

Keywords: Digital Platforms, Antitrust, Corporate Power, Corporate Inversions, Deferred Prosecution Agreements

Suggested Citation

Bone, Jeff, Antitrust Reform: Implications of Prospective Threats by Digital Platforms to Relocate Abroad (April 12, 2020). "Antitrust Reform: Implications of Prospective Threats by Digital Platforms to Relocate Abroad" (2020) Belmont Law Review Vol. 8(1), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3574303

Jeff Bone (Contact Author)

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Pembroke - School of Business ( email )

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PO Box 1510
Pembroke, NC 28372-1510
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4843400845 (Phone)

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