Risk Sharing Externalities

56 Pages Posted: 13 Apr 2020 Last revised: 26 Sep 2025

See all articles by Luigi Bocola

Luigi Bocola

Stanford University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Guido Lorenzoni

Northwestern University; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: April 2020

Abstract

Financial crises typically arise because firms and financial institutions choose balance sheets that expose them to aggregate risk. We propose a theory to explain these risk exposures. We study a financial accelerator model where entrepreneurs can issue state-contingent claims to consumers. Even though entrepreneurs could use these contingent claims to hedge negative shocks, we show that they tend not to do so. This is because it is costly to buy insurance against these shocks as consumers are also harmed by them. This effect is self-reinforcing, as the fact that entrepreneurs are unhedged amplifies the negative effects of shocks on consumers’ incomes. We show that this feedback can be quantitatively important and lead to inefficiently high risk exposure for entrepreneurs.

Suggested Citation

Bocola, Luigi and Lorenzoni, Guido, Risk Sharing Externalities (April 2020). NBER Working Paper No. w26985, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3574449

Luigi Bocola (Contact Author)

Stanford University - Department of Economics ( email )

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

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Guido Lorenzoni

Northwestern University ( email )

2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL Ilocos Norte 60208
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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