The effects of two-way lending between financial conglomerates in bilateral repo markets

65 Pages Posted: 13 May 2019 Last revised: 9 Dec 2025

See all articles by Carlos Cañon

Carlos Cañon

Bank of England; King’s College London

Jorge Florez

Banco de la Republica

Karoll Gomez

Universidad Nacional de Colombia

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: December 06, 2024

Abstract

We examine how market structure, market power, and systemic risk respond to close and intense lending relationships between financial conglomerates (FCs) in non-centrally cleared bilateral repo markets. Using transaction-level data from Mexico, we document persistent and stable funding relationships between FC-affiliated banks and funds, characterized by two distinctive features: First, the funding transactions are two-way, meaning that a pair of rival FCs provide lending to each other on the same day. Second, two-way transactions are executed at lower average rates than one-way transactions. We show that two-way lending (TWL) between FCs contributes to increased market concentration and market power for FC-affiliated funds, while worsening the lending terms for independent banks and funds. Furthermore, we find that the bank-level contribution to systemic risk rises with increased TWL.

Keywords: Repo market, Financial conglomerates, Relationship lending, Competition, Concentration, Market power, Financial stability G1, G23, G28, L4, L22, Two-way lending

JEL Classification: G1, G23, G28, L4, L22.

Suggested Citation

Cañon, Carlos and Florez, Jorge and Gomez, Karoll, The effects of two-way lending between financial conglomerates in bilateral repo markets (December 06, 2024). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3371036 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3371036

Carlos Cañon

Bank of England ( email )

Threadneedle Street
London, EC2R 8AH
United Kingdom

King’s College London ( email )

Jorge Florez (Contact Author)

Banco de la Republica ( email )

Carrera 7 N. 14-78
Bogota, DC
Colombia

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/view/jorge-florez-acosta

Karoll Gomez

Universidad Nacional de Colombia ( email )

Carrera 30 No 45 - 03
Edificio 311
Bogotá, Bogotá None
Colombia

HOME PAGE: http://karollgomez.wordpress.com

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