Donor political economies and the rise of performance-based aid through trust funds

34 Pages Posted: 15 Apr 2019 Last revised: 13 Dec 2021

See all articles by Simone Dietrich

Simone Dietrich

University of Geneva

Bernhard Reinsberg

University of Glasgow - School of Social and Political Sciences

Martin C. Steinwand

University of Essex - Department of Government

Date Written: December 9, 2020

Abstract

The globalization of market norms has contributed to the proliferation of performance-based indicators that are used to evaluate the behavior of states and the success of international organizations. In international development, performance-oriented aid delivery is on the rise, leading to greater levels of outsourcing to non-state actors at the expense of government-to-government aid. This article explores why donors have made trust funds central for performance-oriented aid delivery, highlights the costs of this development strategy, and demonstrates that donors differ in their use of trust funds based on domestic political considerations. We argue that donors who place a high premium on performance in their domestic bureaucracies are more likely to fund organizations operating according to performance-based principles than those who do not assign the same importance to performance assessments. We find robust support for our argument through multilinear regression on a data set of World Bank trust funds. Our project contributes to the understanding of international development cooperation by mapping donor political economies to the rise of trust fund usage. We also contribute to a better understanding of the global diffusion of performance-based evaluation.

Keywords: International organization; performance; foreign aid; trust funds; World Bank

Suggested Citation

Dietrich, Simone and Reinsberg, Bernhard and Steinwand, Martin, Donor political economies and the rise of performance-based aid through trust funds (December 9, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3314915 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3314915

Simone Dietrich

University of Geneva ( email )

102 Bd Carl-Vogt
Genève, CH - 1205
Switzerland

Bernhard Reinsberg

University of Glasgow - School of Social and Political Sciences ( email )

United Kingdom

Martin Steinwand (Contact Author)

University of Essex - Department of Government ( email )

Wivenhoe Park
Colchester CO4 3SQ, CO4 3SQ
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://www.steinwand.us

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